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Occupy Wall Street in Perspective 
 
Craig Calhoun 
 
 Occupy Wall Street was a thrilling protest that briefly 
dominated media attention and reshaped American public life. 
As Todd Gitlin suggests, it was perhaps more moment than 
movement, but of course moments can be very important to 
movements.  
 
Movements are relatively long-term collective engagements 
in producing or guiding social change. Indeed, in the 19th 
century the term social movement was often used to describe 
the actual course of social change, especially change bringing 
broader social participation. The term is now used to describe 
all manner of mobilizations, but it is important to 
distinguish specific protests and other relatively short-term 
manifestations from longer-term patterns of action seeking to 
produce major changes. Movements often proceed in alternating 
phases of intense public action and seeming dormancy, and much 
of the work that shapes the long term is in fact done during 
what appear superficially to be mere spaces between waves of 
activism. The waves, moreover, are often conjunctures among 
multiple movements. In the 1960s, for example, people were 
mobilized not only around peace (or against a specific war), 
but also in the civil rights struggle, union struggles, the 
women’s movement, the environmental movement and so forth. 
Likewise the Progressive Era saw a wave in which mobilizations 
for many causes around labour, immigration, women’s suffrage 
and other issues reinforced each other in a field of movement 
activity. The same goes for the era of the Second Great 
Awakening with religious revitalization itself, temperance, 
labour, women’s and above all anti-slavery movements. 
 
So there is no shame in being more moment than movement. 
It is no denigration of Occupy Wall Street (or the Occupy 
movement(s) more generally) to say it may not have a future as 
such. It may be a shaping influence on a range of movements 
and on the course of social change even if there is no major 
continuing movement under the Occupy name. Even at its height, 
it was a loose-knit coalition among activists with a variety 
of different primary concerns: labour conditions in Walmart, 
fracking and energy policies, financial regulation and indeed 
inequality itself. The phase of intense shared mobilization 
has impacts on each of these as they are pursued separately as 
well as on the chances for renewed future connections.  
 
In these remarks, I want to address five points about 
Occupy Wall Street (OWS). My analysis shares much with Todd 
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Gitlin’s. Gitlin offers an engaging narrative and helpful 
analytic points – both in his BJS lecture and in his book. I 
am particularly appreciative of his ability to make some of 
the dynamism of the movement come alive and his use of 
photographs to make us recall its excitement and challenges. 
That said, I will emphasize points which I think deserve more 
attention or different emphasis from Gitlin’s account.  
 
But one crucial point on which we agree bears restating. 
There may be interesting and important discussions about 
renewing Occupy Wall Street, about “OWS 2.0”, and about 
continuing “the movement”. But for the most part there is 
relatively little reason to expect continuity in OWS as such. 
I will speak of OWS in the past tense – not because it has 
entirely vanished but because my focus like Gitlin’s is on an 
extraordinary six weeks in 2011 and because the next wave of 
intense mobilization will likely come under a different name. 
It will not be just “Occupy Again” but something new, sparked 
by its own exciting innovations, giving voice to new 
participants and new visions.   
 
1. OWS was part of an international wave of mobilization. 
  
Gitlin narrates the story of OWS in almost exclusively 
American terms. This seems at best one-sided. The 
mobilization’s roots, its tactics, and its ultimate 
significance were all international as well as domestic. 
 
The 2008 financial crisis stunned people but initially 
brought little protest. Financial institutions had reaped 
fantastic profits. Their executives had been paid fantastic 
bonuses. And when the financial house of cards they devised 
tumbled, governments stepped in to bail them out with public 
money. Some firms used the public funds to pay another round 
of enormous bonuses even while many ordinary Americans lost 
their jobs or their homes or were threatened with layoffs and 
foreclosures. There were certainly howls of unhappiness, 
Republicans and Democrats sniped at each other over who had 
the better response, but there was little in the way of 
concerted collective action. 
  
People poured into streets in protest and began symbolic 
occupations of public squares – but not immediately after the 
initial crisis and not in New York. Rather, this mobilization 
began in Europe. Initially continental Europeans had regarded 
the financial crisis as an American, or perhaps Anglo-American 
matter. In Britain, the sight of queues outside collapsing 
banks brought alarm. Government efforts to manage the crisis 
brought controversy. But there was little immediate organized 
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protest. This began only in 2010 as the crisis spread to 
Greece, Spain, Portugal and other parts of the Eurozone.  
 
 In each of these countries, occupation of prominent 
public spaces was a central dimension of activism. Syntagma 
Square and Plaza del Sol quickly became globally familiar 
names; images of rallies proliferated. As in New York, 
protesters came with different analyses and ideologies, 
passions and emphases. Some were anarchists, some came from 
more conventional Left political parties. Some were 
participants in efforts to build a new economy through 
cooperatives, barter, and alternative currencies. Some were 
employees of corporations shedding jobs. Some were students 
facing the future fearful there would be no jobs. Increasingly 
often they were national citizens angry at austerity imposed 
not only by their governments but also by global markets, the 
EU, and in particular its most powerful member, Germany. They 
were united by a sense of indignation – both in the sense that 
they were indignantly angry and in the sense that they were 
being treated with little of the dignity owed to citizens. 
 
 This linked the protests in European cities to those in 
the Arab world. In Cairo’s Tahrir Square most famously, but 
also in Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Bahrain and elsewhere in 
Egypt people took to streets and especially public spaces to 
complain of the indignities they suffered §in daily life as 
well as lack of jobs and opportunities, elites who seemed more 
concerned about international business partners than the 
welfare of their compatriots, police brutality, and simple 
dictatorship. From the end of 2010, images of Arabs gathering 
to demand the chance to participate in their societies fully 
and with dignity spread globally, sparking protests as far 
afield as China, and mixing with European examples to 
influence the beginning of OWS. 
 
 That there was a world-wide wave of protests gave added 
weight and significance to each. Visual media shared images of 
urban occupations that brought inspiration and circulated 
tactical ideas. Even before this it is worth noting the 
prominence of Canadian activists in helping to start OWS. And 
it is crucial to see the background – of organizations, 
networks, and ideas - provided by years of mobilization 
against corporate-dominated forms of globalization. OWS did 
not spring into being spontaneously. It was made possible by a 
“prehistory” that included the World Social Forum as well as a 
variety of domestic US campaigns, and contributions from 
activist intellectuals who were not among the core organizers 
as well creativity from those who were. 
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The story of OWS thus needs to be seen as international 
not only interior to the US. This is partly a matter of 
parallels and similarities, partly a matter of more direct 
influences, and very much of a pattern of visual images. 
Indeed, these stretch back before Tahrir to Beijing in 1989 
and Prague in 1968 – perhaps the two most iconic earlier 
sources of images of transformative popular mobilization in 
prominent public squares. 
 
2. Occupation itself helped make and limit the movement 
 
The assembly of citizens is at the center of many protest 
movements. Crowds stand in for “the people” at large. But in 
Zucotti Park as around the world, occupation was an especially 
resonant symbolic tactic. It turns the stranger sociability of 
the crowd into an organized, located, and more enduring 
evocation of the people. And for ordinary citizens to claim 
public spaces in protest is among other things to upset the 
usual symbolic control of those spaces by government and 
“forces of order”.  
 
Occupation is a medium of action, and at the same time a 
desired state of being – as I think Gitlins descriptions show. 
It manifests “the people” or “the citizens” occupying the 
public sphere.  
 
This is a particularly salient symbolism in contexts 
where access to public space is inhibited or controlled. This 
was manifestly an issue in Mubarak’s Egypt, for example, as 
security forces used violence to try to prevent all manner of 
public mobilization. But it was also an issue in New York and 
London, where increasing surveillance had been deployed in 
public spaces and where policing of protests had often 
appeared to deny citizens the right to public demonstrations 
or at least to sharply restrict their use of public space for 
such demonstrations. This had been an issue with police 
response to anti corporate globalization rallies (as, e.g., at 
WTO meetings) and indeed outside political conventions in the 
US. Police worked to control where protestors could assemble, 
making some parts of what had previously been considered 
public space off limits. Urban public space has long been 
contested; parks are not just gifts of elites and urban 
planners but often realized by ordinary people who claim open 
spaces. And in New York and other cities, public spaces had 
been reduced, subjected to increasing securitization and 
management, and even architecturally transformed in places for 
traffic flows but not stationary gatherings in a quiet process 
over decades. Of course this happened partly for reasons like 
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crime control that had widespread public support. Nonetheless, 
this made the claim to public space a key theme for democrats. 
   
The constriction of access to public space was reinforced 
by a trend to privatize public spaces. Zucotti Park was a 
product of this. It was a privately owned space presented as 
available for public traffic. But the space appeared as a park 
because a private developer had accepted responsibility to 
offer it for conditional public use in return for the right to 
erect private buildings with non-public space in excess of 
what zoning laws would otherwise have allowed. This happened 
alongside a reduction in completely available public spaces in 
lower Manhattan, and gave added symbolism to the occupation. 
 
For OWS, as for many of its counterpart movements around 
the world, the right to public space was a crucial claim. It 
was part of a broader and even more basic cluster of claims: 
to be represented, to be considered in decisions, to 
participate, in short to be the public. Participants in these 
protests made the point that the public should not be 
identified with the state but with the people. They claimed 
legitimacy as a representation of the people - at large and 
assembled.  
 
      Occupation also offered a tactical advantage by 
providing a de facto center to a mobilization that sometimes 
denied having centers. OWS famously refused to authorize a set 
of leaders or state a political program as desired by 
reporters and many others. It was not the product of a single 
organizational structure; it made an effort to manage its 
affairs by radical consensus and endless discussion. This was 
facilitated by being in the Square itself. Occupation gave the 
movement a more cohesive identity than the diverse ideologies 
of its members could do, including not least a visual identity 
to outsiders. It made a meaningful project of the simple 
negotiation of everyday decisions.   
 
 It was also in the Square and as a byproduct of material 
conditions that some of the mobilization’s most memorable 
innovations took place. The “human megaphone” for example was 
a response to the desire for a large number of people to carry 
on a discussion in a noisy place. They were deprived of the 
use of electronic amplification by a decision of the police 
and city government. But having each statement amplified by 
repetition in a wave that carried it outward from the center 
(or sometimes in reverse from the fringe to the center) made 
ordinary statements into ritual performances. The human 
megaphone evoked the decentralized, popular nature of the 
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occupation; it made the group a demonstration of participatory 
democracy.  
 
It was also in the occupation itself that connections 
were often forged among different kinds of people and 
different organizations. Sometimes to be sure there were 
offstage negotiations between more or less formally recognized 
leaders. But there was also a constant web of contact and 
mutual awareness. The person who thought fracking was a 
critical issue was not a distant ideological competitor to an 
occupier preoccupied with resisting corporate globalization; 
he was camped in the next tent. 
 
The occupation was also an occasion to perform “the 
people capable of spontaneous order”. This is an important 
theme for protestors claiming that government is illegitimate, 
unnecessary, captured by elite interests, or simply 
overbearing. Through orderly marches and other pageantry 
protestors have long sought to convey that they are not, as 
elites commonly portray them, a disorderly mob. In Tahrir 
Square protestors made a point of cleaning up after collective 
action. In Beijing in 1989 arranging tents in neat rows was a 
symbolic demonstration of the capacity of “the people” to 
govern themselves. And so it was in Zucotti Park – though not 
of course with perfect success. 
 
Occupation itself also provided the meeting point between 
what Gitlin has helpfully called the inner and outer 
movements. In the Square those interested in OWS but new to 
its protests could meet those more centrally involved. New 
recruits could quickly be incorporated into the role of 
dedicated participants. Leaders could lead more “organically” 
or even unobtrusively than at the front of marches or in 
formally organized meetings.  
 
Occupation was a brilliantly powerful tactic but one with 
limits. It made displacement a nearly fatal disruption. The 
movement had a very hard time regrouping. Its lines of 
communication and solidarity were dependent in considerable 
part on proximity in space. As Gitlin suggests, this is where 
a greater degree of formal organization could have helped. 
 
 There is also fragility in the very project of 
representing the people by public gathering. This is all but 
ubiquitous to protest movements. Whether in an occupation or 
marches or sit-ins the participation of a crowd encourages the 
sense of being a part of something bigger than oneself, of 
acting not just as a small minority of the population but as 
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“the people”. Yet this also encourages the illusion that one 
has found much wider support than perhaps one has.   
 
 Occupations also had a tendency to drive a wedge between 
the protestors and liberals who were sympathetic to many of 
the mobilization’s messages. They created sanitary problems, 
potential health and safety issues, and traffic problems. They 
made mayors and university presidents into enforcers of order. 
Many of these may have made the wrong call when they decided 
to evict occupations. In some cases, as at Harvard, this was 
done in a very early and pre-emptive fashion, not as a 
response to any manifest problem. This perhaps dramatized the 
difficult position of university presidents, whether 
personally liberal or not, as they have to manage multiple 
contending forces: students of different views, members of 
boards of trustees, donors. Mayors faced even more acute 
versions of this problem. They are responsible for the smooth 
functioning of urban systems like traffic and waste removal. 
They have diverse constituents. And so occupations of public 
spaces are a very immediate and practical challenge. In New 
York Mayor Bloomberg certainly had other options than to join 
in the decision to end the occupation of Zucotti Park. But 
around the country it was most commonly liberal mayors, black 
mayors, progressive mayors who found themselves trying to 
negotiate an end to the occupation and resorting to police 
force when this proved impossible.  
 
So ironically the otherwise brilliant tactic of 
occupation divided the mobilization from key potential 
supporters. And it needs to be recognized that this is almost 
built into occupation as a tactic. It doesn’t have a natural 
end point. Determined protestors can prolong it indefinitely, 
with new arrivals compensating for the loss of some exhausted 
participants. And of course sanitary and other conditions are 
apt to deteriorate over time. In the case of OWS, the absence 
of any centralized leadership made it hard to negotiate any 
departure. Even more, there was no next big tactic to take the 
place of occupation. The very name of the mobilization made 
this its central identity.   
 
3. Police and media 
 
 In the case of OWS - as in many others - police response 
helped to make the protest flourish and make it visible to a 
broader range of citizens and indeed the world. One assumes 
that police do not do this intentionally. It is hard to 
believe that they are secret supporters of protest movements 
who engage in harsh tactics only to provide symbolic 
demonstrations of the clash between order enforced by violence 
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and the peaceful expression of citizens. Yet it is very often 
the case that police efforts to control or disperse crowds 
provide some of the most influential visual images in protest 
mobilizations. This is at least as old as the mad charge of 
the Manchester Yeomanry that turned a rally at St. Peters 
Fields into the Peterloo Massacre in 1819, but it is of 
renewed importance in an era when such events are played out 
before cameras and images circulated instantly by both 
broadcast and social media. 
 
 Gitlin has rightly stressed the oddities in the behavior 
of the New York police. These include not just violence or 
problematic crowd control techniques but a use of senior 
officers in white shirts rather than uniforms. Whether this 
reflected doubt about the willingness of unionized uniformed 
police to carry out repressive actions or some other rationale 
is unclear. What is clear is that police action reinforced the 
view that state power was lined up to defend the interests of 
corporate capital against the protest of citizens. Moreover, 
this made the state appear to be against assembly, against the 
very occupation of public space. 
 
The same issue played out on college campuses, which have 
often been relatively “safe” spaces for protests. Famously, 
the Chancellor of the University of California at Davis chose 
to use force against peaceful protestors – sending in police 
in riot gear. Some of the police chose to use gratuitous 
violence and indeed were filmed spraying pepper gas into the 
faces of protestors sitting huddled on the ground. Gitlin 
shows the famous photograph which rightly brought widespread 
condemnation. 
 
Gitlin also rightly stresses that OWS was played out 
before and drew much of its sustenance from the media. OWS 
activists tended to see the movement as a mobilization 
sufficient unto itself but this was never really true. It was 
always at least in part a dramatic performance before 
audiences and cameras. This made the relatively small 
occupation – never more than a fraction of the size of crowds 
in Tahrir Square or Plaza del Sol – much more significant. But 
it also meant that it was hard for the movement to control its 
own message and self-presentation.  
 
While social media circulated videos as well as 
commentary among participants and sympathizers, much more 
conventional broadcast media framed OWS for the broader 
public. These latter were slow to pay serious attention, and 
the social media actually helped to attract mainstream media. 
And of course the police made the story much bigger. Still, 
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the mainstream media were just that – not precisely an 
extension of the movement, often confused by it, and largely 
organized in corporate structures the movement distrusted. 
 
 The occupation created a certain charmed community of 
participants linked by the charisma of co-presence. This 
helpfully insulated internal conversations against external 
pressures. But it also limited the further development of the 
moment into a movement.  
 
4. OWS was the first mobilization that focused clearly on 
financial apparatuses that caused the crisis. 
 
 Somewhat surprisingly, no major protests were occasioned 
by the massive market collapse of 2008, nor by the dubious and 
sometimes fraudulent practices that led to it, nor by the use 
of public money in ways that saved banks and rewarded their 
bosses and investors rather than directly helping ordinary 
people. When protests first emerged in Europe, they responded 
to financial debacle, but in a different way. Their immediate 
targets were usually national governments, particularly when 
these seemed complicit in saving financial institutions at the 
expense of citizens. Beyond this there was outrage at the role 
of ratings agencies, interpreted sometimes as though they were 
agents of the US more than of global bond markets, and anger 
at the imposition of austerity measures by the European Union. 
And, indeed European discourse was quickly reframed as a 
matter of nations with different interests and indeed 
moralities rather than any common European citizenry. 
  
 But though the European protests were grounded in a sense 
of indignation the financial crisis greatly exacerbated, they 
generally did not target finance as such but government 
handling of financial issues. Occupy Wall Street shifted the 
focus. And while one can say many things about the ideological 
orientation of movement this basic matter of framing was 
crucial. 
 
There was, of course, the famous claim to speak for the 
99% in contrast to the 1%. This was brilliant framing. As the 
best slogans do, it concentrated the most basic issues into a 
phrase. That Wall Street represented the 1% was of course an 
implication, but the frame also brought a more general 
inequality into focus.  
 
There had been an enormous growth in social inequality 
during the decades since the 1970s when neoliberalism and 
finance capital had been ascendant. But to speak of 
neoliberalism framed the issue largely in terms of political 
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ideology. This rightly grasped the complicity of politicians 
in promoting financial interests over broader interests of 
citizens, but it did not invite participants who did not share 
that particular analysis or its left-wing implications. To 
speak of the 99% vs. the 1%, by contrast, was a populist 
message and as such much more powerful in inviting “the 
people” to have sympathy for the mobilization. 
 
The simple and straightforward focus on inequality united 
people who disagreed on other issues – including what to do 
about inequality. It elicited a visceral response from a wide 
variety of people, because it spoke at once to the giant 
bonuses of Wall Street traders, the struggles of workers and 
the middle class to hang on to homes and jobs, and students 
who would leave university saddled with debt and facing 
uncertain futures. As important, it evoked not only economic 
inequality but also the sense that power and participation in 
all manner of basic social institutions was organized on 
highly unequal bases. Politicians seemed a distant elite and 
political power organized to serve corporations and the 
wealthy not ordinary people. And across sectors institutions 
from the media to academia seemed to be organized as 
structures of inequality and exclusion. 
 
This was a unifying frame for the mobilization, but it 
did not signal an ideological consensus. As Gitlin rightly 
notes, OWS had an inner core and an outer range of more or 
less active participants. Occupation was important partly 
because it was the place the two met. But even in the inner 
core there was not so much agreement on all the issues as 
alliance among people with different priorities. Where 
journalists complained that the movement wouldn’t state a 
simple list of demands or program, in fact part of its 
brilliance and a source of its success lay in refusing this in 
favor of a much broader evocation of outrage. 
 
 Yet, the refusal of the most centrally involved activists 
to state a program left the field open to a variety of others 
who declared themselves to be legitimate representatives of 
OWS. Occupation itself was of course a tactic readily spread 
to other sites. And indeed there were occupations in a range 
of US cities and on university campuses. These extended the 
mobilization’s reach. They also encouraged a continuing 
diffuseness of message. Each occupation could claim to be its 
own instantiation of radical democracy and the voice of the 
people. And the people spoke in different places with 
different messages.  
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OWS was in this sense a populist mobilization. It tapped 
into a widespread sense of being the people, being the 
legitimate basis of society, and being ignored. Different 
issues offered different doors into a shared sense of being 
the people disregarded, the people treated with contempt. This 
is where OWS was joined to the international mobilization of 
the indignant; its participants were also indignados.  
 
Inequality in the US had long been ignored. Indeed it was 
an issue activists found almost impossible to get onto the 
public agenda. Partly this was because it so easily sounded 
“socialist” and this was a taboo word, easily manipulated by 
opponents. Americans also believed that some level of 
inequality was legitimate, a reflection of different levels of 
personal effort and social contribution. Behind the success of 
OWS was growing sense that the level of social inequality had 
become far too great and that the distribution of goods and 
power lacked legitimacy. This had begun to come to the fore in 
the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. This had exposed the 
deep inequalities in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast, their 
racial character, and the extent to which they shaped both 
life chances and the helpfulness of government response. 
Accounts of Wall Street bonuses and the salaries of corporate 
executives – even those driving their companies into 
bankruptcy and laying off workers – drove this message home 
and made it seem national not local. OWS built on and 
enduringly framed the broad issue. 
 
Of course, OWS was about more than inequality. The 
brilliant slogan about the 99% and the 1% almost swallowed the 
movement. It was hard for any more particular issue to compete 
with it. And at the same time, it was diffuse enough that it 
could be claimed by actors with very different agendas. I 
actually heard it taken up by Henry Paulson, the former 
Treasury Secretary and head of Goldman-Sachs – who was not 
precisely advocating for OWS.  
 
 OWS, like many movements, was clearer about what it was 
against that what it was for – beyond the most general values 
of more inclusion, equality, and democracy. Having effectively 
challenged the legitimacy of large-scale financial capitalism, 
however, OWS was naturally faced with questions about what 
alternatives it would favour. And here the proposals ranged 
from government regulation to shareholder activism to reliance 
on barter rather than cash markets. Which was the potentially 
scalable alternative to existing capitalism was not really 
addressed. 
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Of course there were many particular issues and interests 
represented in the loose-knit alliance. In a sense, OWS 
represented all of them; at least it embraced all of them but 
in a sense that meant it prioritized none of them. For core 
activists sometimes tacitly acknowledged the importance of 
links to some other, more focused mobilizations. But overall 
OWS resisted formal organization and formal structures of 
alliance.  
 
This suggests a limit to one of Gitlin’s generalizations. 
He suggests that OWS was in essence grounded in the radical 
social thought of the Enlightenment. He seems this manifested 
in the core democratic freedom that OWS did clearly claim: 
freedom of assembly. But it seems to me that this is only an 
aspect of Enlightenment thought. Enlightenment radicals were 
not necessarily hostile to formal organizations. But at least 
as importantly, the Enlightenment stressed the importance of  
Print-mediated public argument. The project of rational 
decision-making was scaled up to large publics of strangers by 
the circulation of print media. Moreover the very idea of 
public reason was grounded as much in reading as in public 
speaking. 
 
 Some Enlightenment claims like freedom of assembly were 
important to OWS. But OWS was at least as much shaped by 
Romantic thought. It was dedicated to the direct expression of 
feelings, to the importance of passion, to a concern for 
nature both in the sense of the environment and in the sense 
of being true to human nature. And OWS was populist in its 
invocation of “the people” as the decisive locus of moral 
authority. All three of these strands are combined in what we 
might call the American Revolutionary tradition, and this was 
evident throughout OWS. 
 
5. OWS was less an organizational effort - a movement - than a 
dramatic performance.  
 
To resist formal structures of organization was in some 
ways a strength, and it was a basic sensibility for OWS. But 
it was a liability for building an enduring movement. It is 
part of what makes OWS more moment than movement. Lack of an 
organizational structure can deprive a mobilization of staying 
power.  
 
This is a theme Gitlin emphasizes and he is right. As he 
says, OWS had a near "phobia" about formal organizations and 
political parties. It didn’t want to be one or really 
associate with any. In fact many organizations were 
represented informally by members who became involved in OWS, 
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but not in a formal structure. This reflected the OWS attempt 
to be maximally open and inclusive, but also a certain disdain 
for formal organization and more conventional sorts of 
politics which many participants saw as unable to produce 
radical change.   
 
Participants in OWS – and many others engaged in social 
movements and activism today – prefer to speak of networks 
rather than organizations. These networks may be both 
strengthened through social media and activated by social 
media. For OWS, favouring a network structure meant avoiding 
hierarchy while building lateral ties. Recruitment to OWS, as 
to many other recent mobilizations, was itself a matter of 
networks. Activists sometimes speak of a contrast between 
organizations and seemingly free-floating individuals. But in 
fact, people tend to be drawn into mobilizations along with 
friends, classmates, neighbours, and those they knew from 
previous mobilizations. OWS was no exception. Social media are 
effective partly because they amplify such connections, not 
simply as a substitute for them. 
 
In OWS, preference for lateral networking over 
hierarchical organization joined with commitment to a notion 
of democracy as including not prioritizing – making sure the 
issues and values of all were heard and refusing to rank these 
in some order or greater and lesser importance. This 
emphasized one dimension of democratic legitimacy, that all 
the citizens count equally. But it did so in a way that made 
for challenges in building an enduring, effective movement, 
especially on a large scale. 
 
This orientation also led to some immediate practical 
problems for OWS. The spread of self-declared extensions of 
OWS at distances from Wall Street produced different 
occupations claiming equal right to speak for the larger 
mobilization – and speaking differently. Some of these chose 
tactics at odds with efforts to appeal for broader support. In 
Seattle, for example, the Occupy protestors decided that a 
good tactic would be to shut down the port. They made this 
decision unilaterally. That is, it was democratic – but only 
among those who happened to be inside their meetings on the 
relevant days or nights. It was a decision that amounted to an 
attack on the livelihoods of all the workers in the port – 
workers already suffering since the financial crisis. Whether 
from enthusiasm for their own internal democracy, or 
intoxication with the idea that they represented “the people”, 
or their distaste for formal organizations, the Seattle 
occupiers did not see a need to try to reach common cause with 
the trade unions representing the port workers. And thus not 
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surprisingly, the Maritime unions – which in Seattle have a 
strong tradition of left politics and critical analysis as 
well as labour militancy – all opposed the occupation plan. 
This is of course, just one example, but the mobilization was 
repeatedly limited by failures to build alliances beyond those 
implicit inside its inner community. 
 
Gitlin is acutely conscious of the absence of 
organizational structure and effective alliance-building. He 
is right about this. But it also needs to be said that OWS did 
not try and fail in this area, it tried something else. In a 
sense it was like 19th century utopian socialists who tried to 
demonstrate their ideal of a better society by organizing 
communes. It was like 1960s street theatre, possibly 
influenced by Brecht or the Living Theatre, but much more 
about the dramatic performance than the socialist program. The 
anarchism of the movement could be fused with ideals of direct 
action to build a different society and an alternative, 
cooperative economy. But it also lent itself to the gesture, 
the idealist moment, the performance rather than permanence. 
 
This is perhaps misunderstood partly because of the large 
number of people who deeply hoped for a movement – any 
progressive movement - and fell in love with what they thought 
was the potential of this moment when it arrived. Among 
interpreters of OWS, members of the 1960s New Left have been 
prominent, and Gitlin (third president of the SDS) is one of 
these. Gitlin’s view is generally sensible, but it has a 
perspective (one I partly share). But we need to be careful 
not to interpret OWS only in terms of a kind of movement it 
was not.  
 
Again, some of the strength of OWS lay in the same 
approach that limited it. The bases for flourishing quickly 
and spreading widely are not the same as the bases for 
enduring.  
  
Conclusion 
 
Gitlin is right that there is not likely to be a direct 
extension of Occupy Wall Street. It has happened. It was made 
possible by brilliant invention and innovation. OWS was less 
an organizational effort - a movement - than a dramatic 
performance. This leaves open the question of whether its 
successor will be a movement – with action organized to endure 
over time – or another moment of inspired innovation. 
 
In a certain sense, trying to reignite the OWS flame of a 
year ago is actually contrary to the spirit of the 
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mobilization. This stressed a certain spontaneity. Perhaps it 
is not continuity that matters, but rather the next brilliant 
innovation, the next spark that moves people to action. This 
can build on OWS, but if it is to endure, it will have to 
build beyond it. 
 
The Occupy Wall Street mobilization may have been 
temporary but not without enduring effect. Its most important 
impact may lie in culture not movement organization. It may 
lie in readiness to look seriously and critically at 
inequality and at the question of whether actual democratic 
institutions are really working. It may lie in changing, at 
least a little, what people think is possible. 
